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Abstract 
In Italian law there are no general statutory provisions 
requiring participation by interested parties in rulemaking 
procedures. However, specific provisions requiring various forms 
of participation for certain kinds of procedures or authorities are 
increasing in number. After describing some relevant features of 
the Italian legal system and accounting for the legal regime of 
rulemaking, this paper provides a short overview of the relevant 
law, and considers the reasons for the lack of general statutory 
provisions and for the rise in participation practice. In conclusion, 
it focuses on some recent developments that could restrict or 
jeopardize participation in rulemaking. 
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1. The administrative nature of rulemaking. 
As in other European countries, the principle of division of 
powers is not fully operational in the Italian legal system. As for 
rulemaking, however, its inferences are quite relevant, as they 
produce two clear-cut distinctions: the first is the distinction 
between statutory law and administrative acts; the second is the 
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one between judicial functions and administrative functions. On 
both distinctions, administrative rulemaking lies entirely on the 
administrative side. Firstly, regulations issued by administrative 
bodies (including the Government itself) are deemed to be 
administrative in nature, unlike the acts issued by the Parliament 
and by the Government in their exercise of legislative powers. 
Secondly, the Constitution firmly states that the judicial review of 
any act of a public agency may never be prevented nor limited: 
public agencies decide, courts review their decisions. 
These features produce important effects on rulemaking. 
On the one hand, the legal framework of administrative 
regulations is the one provided by the law for administrative acts, 
although with some important variations. On the other hand, such 
regulations are subject to judicial review like any other 
administrative act, with a few procedural peculiarities arising 
from the structure of the administrative court procedure. Courts 
are bound by legislative acts, but they may void administrative 
acts, including regulations issued by agencies. Remarkably, as 
administrative procedures are conceived as being different in 
nature from legislative and judicial ones, their general rules reflect 
neither democratic concerns, typical of legislative activity, nor the 
adversarial design of judicial proceedings. 
Two further remarks are necessary. Firstly, however strict 
the distinction between legislation and administration may be, 
rulemaking questions the distinction between lawmaking and law 
enforcement. The difference between “regolamenti” (regulations) 
and “atti amministrativi generali” (general administrative acts) is 
meaningful in this regard. The former are considered “atti 
normativi” (regulatory provisions) and are included among the 
sources of law, they thus participate in the corresponding legal 
framework: they must be complied with by other administrative 
acts, their infringement is a breach of law, the court is required to 
know them. The latter are simple administrative acts, even if they 
are addressed to many people or to all citizens. The difference 
between the two types is often very uncertain or left to the 
decision of the issuing authority, which may often freely select the 
procedure to be followed. 
Secondly, Italian public law is quite “court-oriented”. 
Unlike other countries, where the principle of the division of 
powers gives rise to limitations to court powers on administrative 
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decisions, the Constitution establishes the courts as the paramount, 
if not only, instrument for the protection of individuals from the 
administrations. The protection of individual rights, which can be 
granted by administrative authorities – including independent 
ones – is never deemed to be enough: in opposition to their 
decision, one can always ask for judicial review. Moreover, the 
Constitution prohibits the establishment of special courts different 
from those envisaged by the Constitution itself. Therefore, the 
distinction between judicial authorities and administrative ones is 
very strict. As for rulemaking, this means that there are no limits 
to the scope of judicial review of regulations and general 
administrative acts. 
 
 
2. Participation in rulemaking: an overview. 
Apart from the said provisions, the Italian Constitution 
does not say much about administrative action. Issued in 1948, 
when the principles of administrative procedures were not very 
“trendy” in Europe, the Constitution does not state any as such 
and does not regulate administrative rulemaking either. The only 
relevant provision, introduced in 2001, concerns the distribution of 
the power to issue “regolamenti” (the regulations that are legal 
sources) among national, regional and local authorities. 
With the lack of constitutional provisions, one has to refer 
to the ordinary legislation. As opposed to the original project that 
produced it in 1990, the general statute on administrative 
procedure does not provide for participation in rulemaking 
procedures. In fact, it does put forward a number of provisions 
concerning participation by interested parties: they have to be 
informed when the procedure begins, have the right to access files, 
and may submit written statements and documents. However, the 
statute explicitly excludes the procedures for the issue of 
regulations and general acts from the scope of these provisions. 
Therefore, in general terms, participation is granted in 
adjudication and not in rulemaking. This exclusion is meaningful 
in terms of the concept of participation embraced by the general 
statute: participation is a tool for the protection of individuals and 
also a channel for the cooperation of citizens in the actions of 
agencies, but it is not an instrument of democracy, nor a way for 
citizens to take part in administrative decisions. 
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Participation in rulemaking is therefore not a general 
principle of the Italian law. It is, however, a general principle 
adopted by a number of Italian regions, which have their own 
general statutes on administrative procedures. Moreover, in 
national law, participation is the rule for some types of 
rulemaking procedures and for specific sectors – forms of 
participation are established both in statutes issued before 1990 
and in statutes issued later. 
As for regional law, after the constitutional reform of 2001, 
it is still unclear to what extent Parliament may set out general 
rules on administrative procedures and to what extent regional 
parliaments may set out different rules. It is not disputed, 
however, that regions may provide a general statute and that the 
latter can provide for increased protection of interested parties, 
even in terms of increased participation; some regional statutes do, 
with provisions contained either in their general statutes on 
administrative procedure, or in other statutes. The main example 
is the Tuscan statute issued in 2007, which both recognizes in 
broad terms the right to participation in regional policymaking, 
establishes a regional authority for the protection and promotion 
of these rights, requires a public debate for important projects, and 
sets general rules for regional rulemaking and planning. 
As for pre-1990 statutes, the main example is the land 
planning act, issued in 1942. It entitles all citizens to access 
planning projects and to submit written statements, and allows for 
stronger forms of participation by interested parties. As an 
example, the provisional urban development plan of a town has to 
be published, and anybody may submit “observations”; similarly, 
real estate owners may submit “oppositions” against the 
provisional detailed plan for their area. Of course, these 
provisions appeared very modern in 1942, but show their limits 
today: participation may only take place in written form and is 
allowed only at a very advanced stage of the procedure, thus it is 
quite unlikely to substantially affect the administrations’ decisions. 
These flaws are however corrected by the statutes of many regions, 
which use their legislative power in this field in order to introduce 
different instruments of participation, such as: “planning 
conferences” in which private parties are admitted; the 
publication of early projects, open to citizen contribution; 
statement of reasons, in which the agency must account for the 
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agreement or rejection of the proposals of interested parties; and 
various forms of agreements between the proceeding agency and 
the interested parties. Moreover, local authorities often adopt 
further mechanisms of participation, which are regulated by 
specific regulations (this happens for example in the largest cities, 
such as Rome). 
As for post-1990 statutes, participation in rulemaking is 
largely the outcome of the influence of global or European law. 
This is the case, for example, in environmental law, where former 
Italian statutes provided for access to information, but not for 
participation in administrative procedures. Many recent statutes, 
on the contrary, offer many forms of participation in such 
procedures: a good example concerns strategic environmental 
assessment. However, these forms of participation are often 
simply mentioned by legislation, without any specific rules or 
procedures, and they are not mandatory (this is the case, for 
instance, for public enquiries). 
The main field of participation in rulemaking, however, 
involves the regulatory powers of independent regulatory 
authorities, which in the last decades spread across Italy as well as 
other European countries. Some of them – especially the ones 
established lately – have almost spontaneously set quite good 
rules on participation. For example, on the basis of a vague 
provision of a wide-ranging statute on public utilities, the two 
existing authorities (one for energy, one for telecommunications) 
developed sound rules of procedure, which make intensive use of 
the notice and comment format, distinguish the proceeding office 
and the decision-making one, and allow for hearings with the 
interested parties. Other independent authorities – mainly the 
older ones supervising financial markets – did not initially 
embrace the principle of participation and the other principles of 
good administration. Some of them even managed to be legally 
exempted by the general statute on administrative procedure: this 
is the case for the Bank of Italy and for the securities market 
Commission (Consob), to which that statute used to apply only “as 
far as compatible”. These provisions, however, have been repealed, 
and these authorities were forced to implement those principles 
by a 2005 statute, which set quite strong rules on participation: 
transparency, regulatory impact assessment, consultation of the 
representatives of regulated industries and consumers unions. 
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Overall, regulation in some of the most important sectors of 
the economy is now subject to rules of participation which often 
take the form of the notice and comment process: the rulemaking 
authority is asked to publish a project, any interested party may 
submit observations, and the authority is required to take them 
into account. Any interested party may challenge a regulation or 
general act in front of an administrative court. If this happens, the 
court will review compliance with procedural law and examine 
the statement of reasons, in order to check that all the relevant 
contributions have been considered. 
Apart from these special provisions, however, rulemaking 
does not yet require participation. There are no participation 
requirements in Government rulemaking, including in those areas 
intensively affecting citizens such as health care; nor for central 
public bodies, such as those operating in the social security sector; 
nor for local government bodies, which have relevant regulatory 
powers. Very important regulations, such as the general 
regulation on public procurement and the one on local utilities are 
going to be issued in the coming months, without any chance for 
participation by private parties. 
The picture, however, is not yet complete, as it shows only 
the law in theory. The law in practice is quite different and shows 
many different forms of participation, which is however often 
very informal and scarcely regulated. It is the consequence of the 
pervious nature of the Italian administration, which was very 
open to the influence of interested parties and organizations. 
Many important administrative decisions, often regulatory in 
nature, are made after informal but intensive negotiations with the 
regulated industry or professional workers trade unions. Relations 
between agencies operating in specific sectors and the 
corresponding regulated industry unions have always been 
intense. As an example, the Government would not make a 
decision concerning state aids to carmakers without a thorough 
consultation of the main national producers. Similarly, the Mayor 
of Rome would never make a decision concerning taxi licences or 
taxi fares without having previously secured consent from drivers. 
Of course, an informal and unregulated participation brings about 
a greater danger of corruption and the risk of disproportionate 
interest representation. Both risks are relatively strong in the 
Italian administration. 
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The reality of the Italian administrative system, 
furthermore, also manifests other forms of participation by 
interested parties, other than procedural participation. In the 
seventies, scholars used to distinguish between procedural and 
“organic” participation, the latter being the appointment of 
interest representatives as members of public bodies, charged with 
administrative tasks linked with corresponding interests: for 
example, professors and students in bodies operating in the 
Ministry of Education and in the universities, industry 
representatives in bodies operating in the public works sector, 
trade union officers in bodies operating in several areas of the 
economy. In some cases, the whole public body entrusted with 
administrative tasks in a certain area, is composed of interest 
representatives: this is common, for example, for many public 
bodies operating in the social security sector. In other cases, 
administrative tasks are assigned to ruling bodies composed of 
representatives elected by the professionals: this is the case of 
many professional associations (lawyers, doctors, engineers and 
many more), to whom the law grants important regulatory 
powers. In all these cases, procedural participation would be 
redundant. 
These other forms of participation undoubtedly have flaws 
as well. Firstly, they are permitted only for selected categories, 
such as those practising the most esteemed professions: this 
explains the origin of the corresponding public professional 
associations, which are the most ancient and powerful. Secondly, 
when professional bodies are charged with the pursuit of public 
interests, it is always possible that they may be biased towards 
professional interest rather than public interest: many people are 
of the advice that this happens frequently with public professional 
associations. Nevertheless, this diversified participation has often 
largely compensated for the lack of procedural participation and 
has altogether secured good channels of communication between 
public authorities and civil society. 
The environment arising from the absence of general rules, 
from the variety of specific ones, and from the availability of 
several informal and alternative instruments of participation, is a 
mixed one. This environment reflects the general attitude of Italian 
legislation towards participation, which is an ambiguous one. This 
attitude displays a tension between the principle of impartiality, 
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which requires administrative neutrality and opposes interest 
representation, and a concern for democracy, which requires a 
greater participation by concerned citizens in procedures affecting 
their interests. One could say that despite the absence of general 
rules, there is much participation in administrative rulemaking. 
However, this participation is usually directed at defensive 
purposes and at collaborative ones, but not at democratic 
purposes: interest representatives are allowed and encouraged to 
express their point of view, in order to both protect professional or 
class interests and provide useful information to the 
administration. But their role is not usually conceived as a way for 
citizens to take part in the performance of administrative tasks 
and to contribute to the pursuit of public interest. 
One last remark – what has been reported so far shows a 
frequent gap between theory and practice in participation. In some 
cases, the law has provided certain forms of participation in 
rulemaking and has introduced new mechanisms, such as the 
public inquiry, but these provisions were not implemented 
because of political and bureaucratic opposition and because of 
the fear of impartial procedures and independent officers. In other 
cases, the law did not provide for participation, but local 
authorities and national agencies however laid down solid rules of 
participation (as in the land planning sector). This difference 
between statute provisions and administrative reality is quite 
typical of the “Italian style”: in theory Parliament can do anything, 
but in practice the administrations’ autonomy is great. 
 
 
3. Arguments for and against. 
A certain hostility towards participation can be traced back 
not only to the principle of impartiality, but – more generally – to 
the traditional way of conceiving democracy, administration, and 
relations between citizens and public authorities. 
Participation in rulemaking procedures is an instrument of 
“direct democracy”, a channel for communication between public 
administration and society. This kind of democracy has never 
been paramount in the Italian law, not even when the Fascist 
regime established the corporative system, intended as a tool for 
confrontation and synthesis of the interests of diverse professional 
categories. It was the outcome of an intense cultural debate on the 
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inadequacy of the political system and on the need for more 
representation of interest. The present Constitution carries a 
reminder of that system in the provision of the National Council 
on Economy and Labour, a body that has always suffered 
substantial irrelevance within the institutional landscape. In fact, 
the Constitution and the political and scholarly mainstreams have 
given much more importance to indirect democracy and to 
political representation: politicians were conceived as the 
necessary intermediaries between the administration and citizens, 
because they can legislate on administration and because 
ministers can address the action of the agencies. 
One of the consequences of the emphasis on political 
representation is the intrusiveness of the law: parliamentary bills 
and governmental law decrees, constituting primary law and 
being mandatory on administrations, have often been used to 
establish very detailed regulations, even in technical matters. This 
reduces the scope of administrative rulemaking and therefore 
scales down the problem of participation. In fact, participation is 
still ensured, but at lawmaking level and in a very informal 
fashion: ministerial cabinets and parliamentary commissions are 
excellent venues for negotiations. This system, of course, does not 
ensure transparency in participation and also fuels legislative 
inflation, which is very high in Italy. 
Another consequence of the emphasis on political 
representation is the concentration of rulemaking powers in the 
hands of the national Government and regional governments. 
Even when the rules are set at administrative level, this is often 
the highest administrative level, as regulatory powers are 
conferred to Government as a whole or to one or more Ministers: 
these are too high-ranked, too far from citizens, and too closely 
incorporated in the political circuit to be open to participation by 
interested parties different from powerful industries. 
Consistent with this concept of democracy is the concept of 
administration that has long prevailed in research and in 
institutional thinking. Public administration was conceived as a 
mechanical instrument for the execution of the law and of political 
decisions. In accordance with this view, the duty of secrecy was 
considered a general principle and there was little room for 
transparency, which is a prerequisite for participation. There was 
an unrealistic faith in the ability of administrative agencies to 
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obtain all relevant information without consulting the regulated 
parties. The authoritarian attitude of administrative law, which 
held sway for a large part of the twentieth century, offered a 
bilateral, adversarial view of relations between agencies and 
citizens. Finally, in harmony with the said concepts of democracy 
and administration, and as a consequence of the strict separation 
between judicial authorities and administrative ones, the 
protection of individuals was always conceived mainly as judicial 
protection. 
The history of the national statute on administrative 
procedure provides further evidence of these tendencies. The 
statute, issued in 1990, was later amended several times, but 
Parliament never considered introducing instruments of 
participation for rulemaking. It has strived to adjust and improve 
other parts of the statute, but not the ones concerning participation. 
Among the provisions that were more frequently amended there 
are those relating to the “conferenza di servizi” (“services 
conference”), an instrument aimed at forcing the different 
authorities involved in the same procedure to come to a decision. 
This shows that the main concern of Parliament is coordination of 
public parties rather than participation by private parties. 
Participation in rulemaking has also been hindered by some 
factors of a less theoretical nature. One is the question of time and 
money. The urban development plan of Rome is a good example: 
it was preliminarily published in 2003, interested parties brought 
10,000 observations, it took three years to assess these 
observations, the plan was finally issued in 2008, and this was 
only the beginning of the judicial review process. 
Another practical reason against participation is peculiar to 
the Italian administration, and it is its resemblance to a weak giant. 
It is often weak in its relations with political bodies and also with 
private organizations. But it is large, it performs many functions, 
and it is accustomed to performing even more of them as public 
bodies and public companies were the main or exclusive 
providers of many services of general economic interest, such as 
energy, telecommunications and air transport. In these areas, there 
was no need for participation by regulated industry in rulemaking, 
simply because there was no regulated industry separate from the 
State: the regulators and the regulated were the same subjects. In 
this situation, consumer participation was not promoted either, as 
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relations between consumers and providers were one and only 
with relations between citizens and the State: political bodies were 
the ones expected to protect consumers from public utilities, and 
were entrusted with regulatory powers. Furthermore, consumer 
participation was also frustrated by the lack of adequate consumer 
associations, which developed late and slow. Only business 
associations and trade unions had an early development and were 
frequently involved in rulemaking procedures. 
Both theoretical and practical reasons against participation 
are however losing ground. The concepts of democracy and 
administration have evolved. Representative democracy is still 
paramount, but various forms of direct democracy have been 
introduced and are considered a necessary completion and 
correction of the political circuit. Mainstream political and legal 
thinking recognize that democracy has to do not only with 
counting preferences, but also with debating and transforming 
preferences. 
As for the concept of administration, the authoritarian 
attitude of administrative law has given way to its liberal attitude, 
which emphasizes the instruments for the protection of 
individuals. Non-judicial instruments of protection, and dispute 
resolution, have developed. Recognition of the plurality of the 
administrative system and appreciation for public-private 
cooperation brought about a less adversarial concept of 
administrative law. Law scholars recognize that the 
administration represents not only the execution of law, but also 
decision-making and interest assessment. Transparency is more 
and more a general principle of administrative law. Awareness 
that agencies are open to the influence of interested parties 
advocates for general rules on open participation. 
Rulemaking, in particular, has changed in several ways. 
First, it is less and less centralized and assigned to the national 
Government. A constitutional provision, as mentioned before, 
establishes regional governments and administrations as ordinary 
rulemaking bodies. As explained before, in many sectors such as 
services of general economic interest and financial markets, 
rulemaking powers are assigned to independent regulatory 
commissions. These regulatory commissions, which are not 
politically accountable and have an open-ended mission, often 
foster the participation of interested parties in order to consolidate 
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their legitimacy and to strengthen their position within the 
institutional system. In many fields, regulatory powers grow in 
scope and nature, sometimes taking the place of adjudication (for 
example, for general authorisations in the field of 
telecommunications), as well as in complexity, making it all the 
more important to obtain information and preferences from 
interested parties. Rulemaking procedures evolve too: regulatory 
impact assessment is more and more required by the law, calling 
for more accurate preliminary examinations. 
Finally, the practical reasons that used to hinder 
participation in rulemaking are also vanishing. Simpler 
participation rules may now be introduced for the most 
complicated procedures. Sectors previously subject to public 
monopolies are now open to free competition, public utilities were 
privatised and now require regulation by public authorities, while 
consumers need to be protected and to have a voice in regulation. 
Consumers associations have spread and grown. 
 
 
4. The evolving scope of rulemaking. 
All these developments encourage procedural participation 
in rulemaking, which is actually spreading in various fields. Still, 
further developments may restrict or jeopardize its spread. These 
developments are connected both with the attitude of legislation 
and with the evolution of administration. At both levels, a 
tendency to escape the ordinary legal framework may be detected. 
As for legislation, the balance between statutory law, which 
binds administrations, and administrative regulations issued by 
the administrations, is always insecure. Many decisions are made 
through statutes, exactly to avoid complex administrative 
procedures that would grant participation and effective controls. 
A fair example is the recent approval of the agreements between 
motorway management companies and the public body in charge 
of their supervision. These contracts, which regulate very 
important issues such as tolls and improvement works required 
from the companies, should be approved by specific government 
bodies. When the proposed agreements were rejected, they were 
then approved by Parliament through a statute: the law was used 
in breach of the law. Drivers had no chance of expressing their 
views. 
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Another way to escape the ordinary legal framework that 
was very common in the past months is the use of emergency 
powers. Since ordinary procedures are regarded as slow and 
intricate, extraordinary powers are used in many situations that 
are not at all alarming, nor unpredictable. The number of 
“ordinanze di urgenza” (emergency orders) issued by the 
Government has dramatically risen. The national Agency for civil 
protection, in charge of emergencies, is entrusted weekly with 
new powers: therefore, many more decisions are made, and much 
more money is spent, through quick and simplified procedures 
that do not allow for participation. 
The emergency model is spreading also across the 
administrative organization. A very recent statute has established 
a civil protection company, owned by the government, set to 
support the Civil Protection Agency. Of course, it will act as a 
private company and will not be bound by the administrative 
procedure statute. Publicly-owned companies were sometimes 
established in order to organize important events, such as 
Olympic or football games. 
More generally, among the main trends in present 
administrative law, the use of private law models for public 
administrations and the assignment of public functions to private 
subjects should be mentioned. These trends certainly have positive 
aspects, but they make it more difficult to ensure participation, 
although the law and the courts often require these private 
subjects to apply the general principles of administrative 
procedure, including the principle of participation. 
Overall, participation in rulemaking is expanding in the 
Italian public administration, but the public administration 
affected is somehow shrinking. 
 
